NOTE
THEY’RE WATCHING YOU:
AN EXAMINATION OF WHETHER THE UNITED
STATES SHOULD IMPOSE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING REGULATIONS ONTO US LAWYERS
Scott Rothstein*

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1390
CURRENT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES ..................................................... 1393
A. The Bank Secrecy Act As Applied To US Financial
Institutions ........................................................................ 1394
1. AML Compliance Requirements ....................... 1394
2. Customer Due Diligence ...................................... 1395
3. Reporting Requirements ..................................... 1396
B. Problems With Current Regulations ...................... 1397
1. AML Regulations have not Proven to be
Effective ...................................................................... 1398
a. Anonymous Shell Corporations Form a
Significant Barrier to AML Enforcement
................................................................................. 1399
2. The Regulations are Expensive......................... 1401
a. The Compliance Costs are Significant .... 1402
b. Penalties are also a Significant Cost to
Financial Institutions..................................... 1405

* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Brandeis
University. I would like to thank Professor Youngjae Lee for his guidance and comments,
the editors and staff of the Fordham International Law Journal, and my family and friends
for their continued support and encouragement.

1389

1390

III.

IV.

V.

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:5

c. AML Regulations lead to Financial
Institution De-Risking ................................... 1406
C. Lawyer’s Roles in Regulating AML.......................... 1408
1. Professional Ethics Requirements and Criminal
Statutes........................................................................ 1408
2. Education Programs .............................................. 1410
3. Voluntary Good Guidance for Lawyers ......... 1411
THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH TO REGULATING
ATTORNEY MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS ................... 1412
A. United Kingdom Application of Lawyer’s Guidance
................................................................................................ 1415
1. UK’s AML Regime.................................................... 1415
a. Money Laundering Regulations 2007 .... 1415
b. Proceeds of Crime Act ................................... 1416
B. The FATF’s “Lawyer’s Guidance” ............................. 1418
1. Overview of the “Lawyer’s Guidance”............ 1418
2. Risk Assessment under the “Lawyer’s Guidance”
........................................................................................ 1419
3. Application of Risk-Based Approach .............. 1420
4. Ambiguity of the Risk-Based Approach under
the Lawyer’s Guidance ......................................... 1422
C. ABA Opposition to AML Regulations for Lawyers
................................................................................................ 1423
THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ADOPT AML
REQUIREMENTS FOR LAWYERS..................................... 1425
A. Existing AML Regulations Have Not Proven To Be
Sufficiently Effective To Justify Expanding Them To
Lawyers .............................................................................. 1426
B. The Expense Of Expanding AML Requirements To
Lawyers Would Be Significant .................................. 1429
C. Current Measures Are Sufficient To Address AML
Risks ..................................................................................... 1432
CONCLUSION............................................................................ 1435
I. INTRODUCTION

The goal of any criminal enterprise, whether it’s human
trafficking, drug dealing, or any other organized crime, is to
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generate a profit. 1 However, after earning their illegal gains,
criminals must introduce those funds into a legitimate financial
system, lest they risk raising the suspicion of law enforcement
officers or leaving a trail of incriminating evidence. 2 Money
laundering is the process criminals use to disguise their financial
assets so that they can spend their ill-gotten gains without risking
exposing their underlying crimes. 3 Therefore, since money
laundering provides the “fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, arms
dealers, and other criminals to operate and expand their criminal
enterprises,” reducing money laundering is critical to reducing
international and domestic criminal activities. 4 However, the
current anti-money laundering (“AML”) legislative framework in
the United States, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (the “BSA”),5 has
been ineffective in significantly curtailing domestic money
laundering.6
One proposal to address the weaknesses of AML regulations,
which has gained traction internationally, is to expand the
regulations to cover lawyers.7 Lawyers, through their specialized
expertise, allow criminals to create legal vehicles that can subvert
AML regulations and facilitate money laundering, 8 specifically
1. See Fin. Action Task Force, What is Money Laundering?, http://www.fatfgafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ [perma.cc/HA73-TD3P] (last visited Apr. 11, 2020); see
also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Introduction to money-laundering,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/introduction.html?ref=menuside
[perma.cc/DU99-ZESH] (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
2. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 1.
3. See id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Money Laundering,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-illicit-finance/moneylaundering [perma.cc/6T7R-PNVE] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020); Rebecca Gregory, The
Lawyer’s Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the Fight against Money Laundering and
Terrorism?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 23, 23n.1 (2003) (“For a discussion of the elements the
government must prove to establish money laundering, see, for example, United States v.
Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 1998), United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1200-04
(1st Cir. 1991), United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1989).”).
4. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 1.
5. See Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, What We Do,
https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do [perma.cc/2S7W-AD5P] (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
6. See infra Part II.B.1.
7. See Fin. Action Task Force, International Standards On Combating Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations
¶22
(2018),
https://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/internationalstandardsoncomb
atingmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferationthefatfrecommendations.
html [perma.cc/ACA5-8RFY].
8. See infra text accompanying notes 180-81.
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through the use of anonymous shell corporations.9 However, in the
United States, enforcement of AML regulations by lawyers remains
voluntary and patchwork10 and the American Bar Association (the
“ABA”) opposes expanding mandatory AML compliance to the legal
profession.11
One country that has expanded AML regulations to cover
lawyers, however, is the United Kingdom.12 In the United Kingdom,
the two pieces of legislation that address AML regulations are the
U.K. Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (the “Regulations 2007”)
and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”). 13 The United
Kingdom initially extended some of its AML regulations to lawyers
in response to a 2001 directive from the European Union,14 but in
December 2007, it formally adopted the Regulations 2007 that
were drafted to conform with international standards set by the
Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”).15
Part II of this Note examines the current AML regulatory
framework in the United States, including how the BSA regulates
financial institutions, the impact it has had on them, and how
American lawyers currently self-regulate AML risks. Part III
explores how the United Kingdom expanded its AML regulations to
the legal field, including an analysis of the international standards
it adopted from the FATF’s “RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals”
(the “Lawyer’s Guidance”), and why the ABA opposes adopting the
United Kingdom’s approach to regulating lawyers. Part IV
recommends that the United States should not adopt the United
Kingdom’s approach of mandating AML regulations in the legal
field.

9. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-TERRORIST
FINANCING MEASURES: UNITED KINGDOM MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT 208 (Dec. 2018),
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom2018.pdf [perma.cc/ML8F-E25Q]; see also infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.A.1.
14. See Colin Tyre, Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: Implementation of the FATF
Forty Recommendations in the European Union, J. PROF. L. 69, 76 (2010).
15. Compare id. at 79, with European Commission Press Release MEMO/12/112,
Frequently asked questions: EU fight against money-laundering and terrorist financing
moves up a gear: European Commission takes action to meet the revised international
standards adopted by the Financial Action Task Force (Feb. 16, 2012).
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II. CURRENT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
In the United States, the framework for AML regulations of
financial institutions is the BSA. 16 The BSA requires financial
institutions to assist US government agencies in detecting and
preventing money laundering through internal control and
reporting requirements. 17 However, the BSA’s impact on the
amount of money laundered in the United States is unclear thus far,
and there is evidence that it has not impacted the amount of money
laundered at all.18 Further, the costs of these regulations may have
led to unintended consequences.19 While the BSA has historically
and primarily targeted banks, 20 in recent years other industries,
including casinos, card clubs, and money service businesses, have
fallen under certain regulations within the BSA. 21 However, the
BSA regulations have never been expanded to legal professionals,
leaving lawyers free to self-regulate how they address AML risks
through ethical rules and ABA educational programs.22

16. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/bsa/index-bsa.html [perma.cc/ST8339TR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020); see also FDIC, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/bsa/index.html
[perma.cc/QR2QN5LP] (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
17. See Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN’s Mandate From Congress,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations [perma.cc/7QV2-HJVT] (last
visited Apr. 20, 2020).
18. See infra Part II.B.1.
19. See infra Part II.B.2.
20. See generally Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 16.
21. See generally 31 C.F.R. §§ 1020-1030 (listing the different types of entities that
FinCEN regulates). A money service business includes any person offering “check cashing;
foreign currency exchange services; or selling money orders, travelers’ checks or pre-paid
access (formerly stored value) products” or who “engage[] as a business in the transfer of
funds.” See Internal Revenue Serv., Money Services Business (MSB) Information Center,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/money-servicesbusiness-msb-information-center [perma.cc/AG5N-T6M5] (last visited Apr. 11, 2020); see
also
Fin.
Crimes
Enf’t
Network,
Money
Services
Business
Definition,
https://www.fincen.gov/money-services-business-definition
[perma.cc/V6VV-7563]
(last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
22. See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Bank Secrecy Act As Applied To US Financial Institutions
1. AML Compliance Requirements
Currently, the BSA requires US financial institutions to assist
US government agencies in detecting and preventing money
laundering, 23 and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”), which covers more than 80,000 financial institutions,24
oversees the BSA’s implementation and enforcement. 25 The BSA
requires financial institutions to implement an AML program that
includes: (1) internal controls to ensure BSA compliance; (2)
independent compliance testing; (3) designating a BSA compliance
officer; (4) employee training; and (5) risk-based procedures for
conducting ongoing customer due diligence, which should include:
(i) understanding the nature and purpose of customer
relationships to develop a customer risk profile, and (ii)
conducting ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious
transactions, and maintaining and updating customer information
and beneficial ownership information. 26 The statute and
regulations do not dictate the specifics of these programs, instead,
they allow each financial institution to tailor its program to its size,
location, and business activities.27
Banks must tailor their AML programs to their specific risks
by first assessing their vulnerabilities to money laundering.28 This
risk depends on a bank’s (1) offered products and services, (2)

23. See Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, supra note 17; see also Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, supra note 16; 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1970) (defining “financial
institution”).
24. See Statement of Jamal El-Hindi, Acting Dir., FinCEN U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury
Before the H. Subcomm. On Terrorism and Illicit Fin., 115th Cong. 3 (2017). Approximately
4,700 of these covered financial institutions are commercial banks. See FDIC, Statistics At
A
Glance
As
of
December
31,
2018,
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2018dec/industry.pdf
[perma.cc/X7J8UQ4G] (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
25. See Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, supra note 17.
26. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210.
27. See Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Director James H. Freis, Jr., SIMFA Anti-Money
Laundering Compiance Conference (Mar. 10, 2008) (“our rules recognize that one size does
not fit all. . . . Rather, based upon a risk assessment, a firm should focus its AML program,
and thus its finite AML compliance resources, most significantly on the areas of greatest
risk.”).
28. STEVEN MARK LEVY, FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION: BANKING, CORPORATE
& SECURITIES COMPLIANCE, 6-24 (2nd ed. 2020).
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customer types served, and (3) geographic locations.29 Attempts to
launder money can originate from many sources, but certain
products, services, customers, entities, and geographic locations
may be more vulnerable to abuse.30 Banks should evaluate the risk
of certain products or services, including ones that may facilitate
greater anonymity in transacting or involve handling high volumes
of currency, 31 as well as the risk posed by their customers by
looking at the “nature of their business, occupation, or anticipated
transaction activity,”32 and the specific risks of doing business in
certain geographic locations33 where there may be a higher risk of
illicit activity.34
2. Customer Due Diligence
The key component of Money Laundering compliance is
Customer Due Diligence (“CDD”). CDD “means understanding who
the customers are and what type of transactions they conduct.”35
Financial institutions must verify the identity of their customers36
and then develop a customer risk profile based on the nature and

29. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 19 (2014).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 20.
33. Id. at 21. These higher risk geographic areas can include countries identified as
sponsoring terrorism, countries with weak AML regulatory regimes of their own, or areas
in the United States known to have a high degree of drug trafficking. See id. at 21-22.
34. Such higher risk jurisdictions can include “[j]urisdictions or countries monitored
for deficiencies in their regimes to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by
international entities such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).” Id. at 22. One such
recent addition to this list includes Iceland, which was added to the FATF’s list of
jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies on October 18, 2019 and was included in a
subsequent FinCEN Advisory Notice for deficiencies in beneficial ownership transparency
and in implementing financial sanctions. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, IMPROVING
GLOBAL AML/CFT COMPLIANCE: ON-GOING PROCESS – 18 OCTOBER 2019 (Oct. 18, 2019),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitoredjurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-october-2019.html
[perma.cc/39YJ-BGUA];
FINCEN, ADVISORY ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE-IDENTIFIED JURISDICTIONS WITH ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM DEFICIENCIES AND RELEVANT
ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
15
(Nov.
12,
2019),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2019-1112/FATF%20Advisory%20October%202019%20FINAL_508.pdf
[perma.cc/HQW5ZY8Y].
35. Levy, supra note 28, at 6-36.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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purpose of the customer relationship, 37 which is then used to
monitor the customer’s activity for suspicious transactions.38 The
financial institution must verify the identity of each customer to
the extent reasonable and practicable under a risk-based
approach39 to enable the bank to form a reasonable belief that it
knows the identity of each customer.40
Further, to address the risk that individuals may use “straw
men” or nominees to shield themselves from identification, 41
effective May 2018,42 financial institutions are required to verify
the identities of the beneficial owners behind their customers, or
the true owners of the relevant account.43 This means that financial
institutions must verify: (i) any individual who owns twenty-five
percent or more of the equity of a customer;44 (ii) an “individual
with significant responsibility to control, manage, or direct a legal
entity customer;” or (iii) if a trust owns twenty-five percent or
more of a legal entity customer, the trustee.45 However, a bank may
rely on the representations of the customer itself as to its own
beneficial ownership information, even if provided by the
nominee.46
3. Reporting Requirements
Under the BSA, financial institutions are also required to “file
reports on large cash transactions [a ‘Currency Transaction
Report’ or ‘CTR’], transactions that raise suspicions [a ‘Suspicious
Activity Report’ or ‘SAR’], and other transactions that may relate to
money laundering, terrorism, or other crime.”47 The CTR and SAR
37. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg.
29398, 29398, 29420 (May 11, 2016).
38. Id. at 29398, 29420.
39. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2014).
40. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2).
41. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, supra note 37,
at 29410.
42. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions; Correction, 82
Fed. Reg. 45182, 45182 (Sept. 28, 2017).
43. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230.
44 . Id. This means that the financial institution must verify the identity of any
individual who owns 25% or more of the equity of the corporation, partnership, or other
entity that is the customer of the financial institution.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Levy, supra note 28, at 12-3.
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are the two most common and central reports filed by banks under
the BSA. 48 Financial institutions are required to file a CTR and
verify the customer’s identification for each transaction greater
than US$10,000.49
Financial institutions file SARs when they detect “suspicious
activity related to money laundering, terrorist financing, or other
criminality.”50 About 1.4 million and 1.5 million SARS were filed in
2018 and 2017 respectively. 51 Financial institutions are in a
unique position to serve as the eyes and ears of the government
since most money laundering activity passes through a financial
institution at least once, giving staff a face-to-face opportunity to
observe launderers when they set up their accounts and judge if
their activity is suspicious.52 Banks are required to maintain a copy
of a filed SAR with supporting documentation for five years after
filing 53 and to make the documentation available to any law
enforcement or federal regulator examining the bank’s BSA
compliance.54 SARs, and any information that would reveal their
existence, are confidential 55 and financial institutions are
prohibited from notifying persons involved in a transaction that a
SAR was filed.56
B. Problems with Current Regulations
The BSA has been ineffective in reducing the flow of money
laundering throughout the United States. 57 Instead the BSA has
48. See id. at 13-5.
49. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (listing the other requirements for CTR filings).
50. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2018); see also 31 U.S.C. § 1010.320 (2018).
51. See FinCEN, Suspicious Activity Report Statistics,
https://www.fincen.gov/reports/sar-stats [perma.cc/86HP-ELFF] (last visited Apr. 14,
2020). Filtered for all industries and states/territories, for the years 2017, and 2018, and
for Money Laundering Suspicious Activity Category; see also FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES: UNITED STATES MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT 54 (Dec. 2016) (noting an average of 1.7 million SARS filed annually
between 2012 and 2014).
52. See Levy, supra note 28, at 14-14.
53. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320.
54. Id.
55. See id. § 1020.320(e). However, there are certain exceptions to this confidentiality
such as with compliance audits or in communications between banks concerning a joint
SAR. See, e.g., id. § 1020.320(e) (2020); 12 C.F.R. § 208.62(j) (2020); 12 C.F.R. §
563.180(d)(12) (2020); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k) (2018).
56. 31 U.S.C. 5318(g)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
57. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
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been burdensome on banks, with many banks considering the BSA
regulations to be the most expensive regulations they face.58 These
regulations have also driven many banks to have to consolidate
and drop certain customers, reducing access to the financial
system in the United States.59
1. AML Regulations have not Proven to be Effective
US AML regulations have been ineffective in combating
international money laundering. 60 The amount of money
laundered globally is not precisely known, 61 however a widely
quoted estimate is “somewhere between two and five percent of
the world’s gross domestic product,”62 or about US$1.5 trillion to
US$3.7 trillion in 2015. 63 Estimates of the amount of money
laundered in the United States meanwhile, appear to have
remained stable at approximately US$300 billion per year since
2010 up to as recently as 2018.64
58. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
59. Id.
60. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
61. Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 1 (“[d]ue to the illegal nature of the
transactions, precise statistics are not available and it is therefore impossible to produce a
definitive estimate of the amount of money that is globally laundered every year.”)
62. Id.; see also United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, Money-Laundering and
Globalization, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html
[perma.cc/PA4T-JWYE] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020); United Nations Office on Drugs &
Crime,
Illicit
money:
how
much
is
out
there?
(Oct.
25,
2011),
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-muchis-out-there.html [perma.cc/VU3N-RLCD] (noting that in 2009, “Criminals, especially drug
traffickers, may have laundered around $1.6 trillion, or 2.7 per cent of global GDP.”).
63. John A. Cassara, Countering International Money Laundering 9 (2017),
https://thefactcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Countering-InternationalMoney-Laundering-Report-August-2017-FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/DP8Q-ME4B]. This would
also be about US$1.7 trillion to US$4.3 trillion in 2018. THE WORLD BANK, GDP (CURRENT
US$),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&start=1960&view=
chart [perma.cc/5J5F-PWA3] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (multiplying two percent and five
percent by 2018 world GDP of US$85.91 trillion).
64. See Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance: Regulator
and Law Enforcement Perspectives on Reform: Statement Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Steven M. D’Antuono, Section
Chief, Crim. Division Fed. Bureau of Investigation) (“The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crimes
estimates that annual illicit proceeds . . . of crime generated in the United States were
estimated to total approximately $300 billion in 2010, or about two percent of the overall
U.S. economy at the time.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
RISK ASSESSMENT 86 (2015) (“An estimated $300 billion is generated through illicit activity
annually in the United States”); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISK
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Meanwhile, the crime of money laundering itself is also
significantly under-enforced. Less than one percent of global illicit
financial flows are seized and forfeited65 and, in the United States,
money launderers face a less than five percent risk of conviction
for their crime. 66 In absolute terms, there are only about 700 to
1,200 federal money laundering convictions per year in the United
States, which is a small amount considering this number includes
individuals who only had money laundering charges added to an
existing indictment.67 Further, there has never been a cost-benefit
analysis undertaken of AML efforts and “[t]here is no evidence that
any governments have made rigorous efforts to weigh costs [of
AML regulations] against benefits.”68
a. Anonymous Shell Corporations Form a Significant Barrier to
AML Enforcement
A key deficiency driving the ineffectiveness of US AML and
combating the financing of terrorism (“CFT”) measures has been
the abuse of creating anonymous corporations (“shell companies”)
to hide beneficial ownership information,69 with the United States
ASSESSMENT 2 (2018) (noting that the United States continues to estimate that $300 billion
was potentially laundered in 2018); Press Release, Am. Bar Found., Report Questions
Global Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorism (Jan. 30, 2014) (citing TERENCE
HALLIDAY, GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE OF DIRTY MONEY: ASSESSING ASSESSMENTS OF REGIMES TO
CONTROL MONEY-LAUNDERING AND COMBAT THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2014) (noting no
convincing evidence “that proceeds of crime are reduced or crime itself is better controlled
with
anti-money
laundering
measures.”)),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/news/675 [perma.cc/R3Z7-V8VK].
65. Samuel Rubenfeld, Is Anti-Money Laundering Working? No, It’s Failing, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2017/11/21/isanti-money-laundering-working-no-its-failing/ [perma.cc/T76U-P7BB]; see also United
Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug
Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized crimes 7 (Oct. 2011),
https://www.academia.edu/2998395/Estimating_illicit_financial_flows_resulting_from_
drug_trafficking_and_other_transnational_organized_crimes [perma.cc/7ZWA-TELX]
(“Globally, it appears that much less than 1% (probably around 0.2%) of the proceeds
of crime laundered via the financial system are seized and frozen.”).
66. Cassara, supra note 63, at 17.
67. Id.; see also Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 51, at 64 (“the U.S. . . . achieves over
1200 Federal ML convictions per year on average.”).
68. See Am. Bar Found., supra note 64 (citing Halliday, supra note 64).
69. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 51, at 4; see also Financial Secrecy Index
2020:
Narrative
Report
on
USA,
TAX
JUST.
NETWORK
8,
https://fsi.taxjustice.net/PDF/UnitedStates.pdf [perma.cc/A86W-MHMM] (last visited
Mar. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Financial Secrecy Index] (noting how the United States is used
as a secrecy jurisdiction by foreigners, including the use of US banks to launder money for
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considered one of the most secretive financial jurisdictions in the
world.70 A shell company is a company or legal person formed with
no significant assets or operations in the jurisdiction in which it is
registered. 71 Shell corporations are easy to set up and “can be
[opened] in as little time as it takes to open up an e-mail account
and with less information than it takes to sign-up for a library
card.”72
Shell corporations can aid money launderers and impede law
enforcement investigations by shielding beneficial ownership
information.73 Criminals can create a network of shell corporations
to increase the layers of secrecy and “hire [an unrelated] nominee”
as a company director to make it harder for law enforcement
officers to find the true beneficial owner.74 Banks can exacerbate
this obfuscation by failing to verify the beneficial ownership of
shell corporations, sometimes even accepting passport photos of a
shell’s straw-man without requiring any further information.75 For
law firms that assist in incorporating these shells, many are unable
to assist law enforcement officers in identifying beneficial owners
because they do not work with potential beneficial owners

Mexican drug gangs, Miami’s attraction of “dirty” money, and how US real estate is used as
a tax haven for foreign wealth).
70. See Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 69, at 1 (ranking the United States the
second most secretive financial jurisdiction in the world); see also Idelys Martinez, The
Shell Game: An Easy Hide-And-Go Seek Game For Criminals Around the World, 29 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 185, 197-98 (2017).
71. See Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Through the Real Estate Sector, FIN.
ACTION
TASK
FORCE
14
(Jun.
29,
2007),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20through%20the%20Rea
l%20Estate%20Sector.pdf [perma.cc/ZV4L-UDLR] [hereinafter Money Laundering &
Terrorist Financing]; see also Martinez, supra note 70, at 195 (“In essence, shell companies
are business entities that are hollow and are intended to carry out operations in the
shadows”).
72. See Martinez, supra note 70, at 196-97; see also Jim Zarroli, Want to Set Up A Shell
Corporation To Hide Your Millions? No Problem, NPR (Apr. 13, 2016, 4:41 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/04/13/474101127/want-to-set-up-a-shell-corporation-tohide-your-millions-no-problem [perma.cc/QHW4-SJ5Y] (“[S]etting up a shell corporation
turns out to be something that any average Joe can do.”).
73. See Cassara, supra note 63, at 16; see also Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing,
supra note 71, at 14 (noting how shell companies represent a significant challenge when
seeking to determine a beneficial owner).
74. See Martinez, supra note 70, at 197.
75. Id. at 201 n.78.
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personally, 76 and those that do will often incorporate their
companies even if the owner’s motives appear suspicious.77
The new beneficial ownership requirement, discussed in Part
II.A.2, that requires banks to identify beneficial owners of entities78
is one way the United States has adapted to address these issues,
but these regulations have been criticized as ineffective. John
Cassara, a former US Intelligence Officer and Treasury Special
Agent, 79 argues that the regulation’s definition of a beneficial
owner does not comport with the internationally recognized
definition and has multiple loopholes.80 The beneficial ownership
requirement mandates that a bank identify any shareholder with a
twenty-five percent or greater interest in a corporation that banks
with them, 81 but Cassara notes that if no one person owns that
twenty-five percent threshold of the corporation, then the bank
need not identify any shareholders at all.82 Further, Cassara notes
that alternatives, such as listing a senior manager or trustee as the
beneficial owner, do not serve the correct purpose because they
are not the true owner of a corporation’s or trust’s assets. 83
Additionally, banks do not need to incorporate the beneficial
ownership information into their records or keep copies of the
verification information, and the bank can rely on the information
provided by the filer, even though the form is not filed under
penalty of perjury.84
2. The Regulations are Expensive
Some of the most significant problems with current US AML
regulations are the expense of maintaining compliance and the

76. Id. at 202.
77. Id. at 203.
78. See supra Part II.A.2.
79. Cassara, supra note 63, at 27.
80. Id. at 22.
81. See supra Part II.A.2.
82. Cassara, supra note 63, at 22.
83. Id.
84. Id. (noting that the form only requires that the individual provide information “to
the best of their knowledge”); see also Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial
Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29397, 29405 (July 11, 2016) (“Some commenters urged FinCEN
to make the Certification Form an official U.S. Government document, with the certification
made under the penalty of perjury (rather than only to the best of the knowledge of the
certifying party).”).
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costs of penalties that can be imposed on institutions.85 Both costs
are particularly burdensome for smaller institutions.86 These costs
are exacerbated by the ambiguity of the regulations, which creates
uncertainty for financial institutions.87 To reduce costs, banks will
drop customers they determine to be riskier, a process known as
“de-risking.”88
a. The Compliance Costs are Significant
To comply with the BSA, financial firms collectively spend
about US$25.3 billion per year 89 and studies have found that
“[b]anks pay more to comply with money-laundering rules than
any other regulations.” 90 These compliance costs are even more
significant for smaller institutions that do not have the economies
of scale to meet these requirements and keep costs down. 91 An
increasing number of smaller institutions have responded to these
costs by consolidating, thereby reducing the number of smaller
banks in the United States.92
Part of the problem is the amount of time banks must spend
filling out CTRs and SARs. It is estimated that financial institutions,
on average, devote sixty minutes to each CTR filed,93 which means
that financial institutions collectively spent approximately 14.8
million hours filling out CTRs in 2011 and 14 million hours in

85. See infra Part II.B.2.a, II.B.2.b.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 97–102, 114–15.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 118–21.
88. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
89. Anti-Money Laundering compliance costs U.S. financial services firms $25.3 billion
per year, according to LexisNexis Risk Solutions, LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://risk.lexisnexis.com/about-us/press-room/press-release/20181010-true-costaml [perma.cc/U8QA-V24N]; see also A New Paradigm: Redesigning the U.S. AML/CFT
Framework to Protect National Security and Aid Law Enforcement, CLEARING HOUSE 3 (Feb.
2017),
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/TCH/Documents/TCH%20WEEKLY/2017
/20170216_TCH_Report_AML_CFT_Framework_Redesign.pdf [perma.cc/PUW7-2GWP] .
90 . See Todd Davenport, Laundering Rules Top Compliance Expenses Survey, AM.
BANKER, Jun. 23, 2003, at 23.
91. See infra text accompanying note 104.
92. See infra text accompanying note 103.
93. Robert G. Rowe, III, Comment Letter on Currency Transaction Report, FinCEN Form
104,
A M.
BANKERS
ASS’N
(DEC.
1,
2009),
https://www.aba.com/archive/Comment_Letter_Archive/Comment%20Letter%20Archi
ve/fincen-pra-12109.pdf [perma.cc/P3LA-G6RN].
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2010.94 For SARs, FinCEN estimates the average reporting burden
as two hours per SAR, or a total of 4,696,790 hours per year.95 In
addition, financial institutions incur significant expenses to hire
and train employees on BSA compliance, to purchase accountmonitoring software, to implement adequate internal controls, and
to conduct independent compliance testing.96
These costs are more significant for smaller banks, 97 which
are hit hardest by AML compliance costs relative to their bottom
lines.98 This is due to certain overhead investment requirements
for AML programs that exist regardless of scale.99 Additionally, an
American Banking Association 2012 survey found that mid-sized
banks, banks with US$1-US$9 billion in assets, “have an average of
four full-time compliance employees dedicated to BSA/AML
functions,” which is beyond the staffing capacity of many smaller
banks. 100 There is also the burden of finding BSA compliance
employees, as small banks can have a difficult time hiring for these
positions due to stiff competition from larger banks and the
difficulty in finding experts knowledgeable in fields like
cybersecurity.101 These costs of finding and hiring more staff and
paying consultants to address BSA/AML compliance have led to
earnings losses and foregone dividends.102
94. See ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, FINCEN 7 (2011) (“about 14.8 million CTRs
were filed in fiscal year 2011, compared with about 14 million in fiscal year 2010.”). Given
the American Banker’s Association’s estimate of 60 minutes of time expended per CTR on
average, see text accompanying supra note 93.
95. See Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Update and Revision of the FinCEN
Suspicious Activity Reports Electronic Data Fields, 82 Fed. Reg. 9109, 9110-11 (Feb. 2,
2017).
96 . See Levy, supra note 28, at 13-5; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the
compliance requirements for financial institutions).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 97–102.
98. LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS, supra note 89 (calculating that the cost of compliance
for smaller firms up to .83% of total assets, but only .08% for larger firms).
99. Id.
100. Daniel S. Alter, How to Lighten Community Banks’ AML Compliance Load, AM.
BANKER, May 1, 2015.
101. Id. (“[T]he market is short on qualified personnel to satisfy expanding BSA and
AML demands.”); see also Bill Stoneman, New Regulatory Problem: Filling Compliance Jobs,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 1, 2005, at 12 (noting that small banks have difficulty finding compliance
officers).
102. See, e.g., John Reosti, BSA Staff Goes from 3 to 22 at One Community Bank, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 2017, at 4 (detailing how Carter Bank in Virginia’s BSA/AML compliance costs,
such as increasing the number of employees in its BSA department from 3 to “a minimum
of 22,” increasing board oversight of BSA compliance, overhauling and upgrading its
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The BSA, along with other costly regulations, has also forced
many small banks to consolidate, thereby reducing the number of
small banks in the United States.103 In 2015, the Harvard Kennedy
School of Government found an increasing trend of consolidation
among small community banks, primarily driven by “regulatory
economies of scale [because] larger banks are better suited to
handle heightened regulatory burdens than are smaller banks,
causing the average costs of community banks to be higher.”104 The
report found that among the regulations causing these burdens
were the BSA and other AML regulations.105 The US Government
Accountability Office (the “GAO”) 106 also found BSA/AML
regulations to be some of the most burdensome to smaller
institutions. 107 Representatives from the smaller banks that the
GAO examined cited the time their staff spent addressing the
regulations, the costs of implementing system upgrades or hiring
third party compliance specialists, and the costs of due-diligence
as responsible for causing the burdens placed on smaller banks.108
training and retaining an outside firm to conduct a review, led to forgoing its fourth quarter
2016 dividend and how CU Bancorp expected annual expenses to rise by about $3 million
due to BSA compliance); see also Allison Prang, BSA compliance costs take toll on Investors
Bancorp earnings, AM. BANKER, Jul. 31, 2017 (describing how Investor Bancorp in Short
Hills, N.J. blamed a drop in Q2 2017 quarterly earnings on the costs of addressing BSA/AML
compliance).
103 . See Leslie Picker & Matthew Monks, Small Banks Feel the Urge to Merge,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK, Oct. 7, 2013, at 49-52.
104. See Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking 21
(Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 37, 2015); see also Stoneman, supra note 101,
at 12 (“[T]he growing compliance burden is one reason that” First Fowler Bancorp Inc.
agreed to be sold to Sunflower Bank); James Wilcox, Economies of Scale and Continuing
Consolidation of Credit Unions, FRBSF ECON. LETTER, Nov. 4, 2005, at 1 (finding that BSA
costs are born disproportionately by smaller institutions, which incentivizes
consolidation); Laura Thompson Osuri, Small-Bank Deal Drivers: Costs, Regulatory
Pressure, AM. BANKER, May 24, 2005 (“[T]he preponderance of small, underperforming
banks reflects merger trends, growing pains, and a heavier regulatory burden.”).
105 . See Lux & Greene, supra note 104; see also Alter, supra note 100 (“[T]he
American Banking Association has identified BSA and AML requirements as ‘the most
costly regulatory burden.’”).
106. The GAO is an agency that examines how tax dollars are spent and provides
government agencies with reports and testimonies to help them work more efficiently. See
Overview,
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
https://www.gao.gov/about/
[perma.cc/EA3V-F2HK] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
107 . See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS:
REGULATORS COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO ADDRESS COMPLIANCE BURDENS 51 (2018); see
also John Reich, Tackling the Burden, COMMUNITY BANKER, Sept. 2005, at 38.
108. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 107, at 18-20.
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b. Penalties are also a Significant Cost to Financial Institutions
The cost of penalties imposed on banks for compliance
deficiencies is also significant. 109 Banks that violate certain
provisions of the BSA can face “criminal money penalties up to the
greater of $1 million or twice the value of the transaction.”110 In
fact, Regulators assessed US$5.2 billion in fines, penalties, and
forfeitures for violations of BSA/AML regulations from 2009 to
2016.111 Further, trends appear to indicate that the frequency and
size of these penalties will rise in the future.112
Each individual penalty can also be significant, with some
penalties in excess of US$1 billion. 113 Even smaller fines can be
significant, for example, a fine imposed against the Bank of Mingo
of Williamson, West Virginia of only US$4.5 million114 amounted to

109. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
110. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(d) (2018); see also FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra
note 29, at 9.
111. Reosti, supra note 102, at 4; see also, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: FINES, PENALTIES,
AND FORFEITURES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRIMES AND SANCTIONS REQUIREMENTS, U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 11 (2016).
112. See Sharon Brown-Hruska, Developments in Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money
Laundering
Enforcement
and
Litigation
7-8
(2016),
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/PUB_Developments_BSA
_AML_Lit-06.16.pdf [perma.cc/HA2F-D3C7]; see also Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 2015 YearEnd Review of BSA/AML and Sanctions Developments and Their Importance to Financial
Institutions
2
(2016),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2015_Year_End_Revie
w_of_BSA_AML_3_3_16.pdf [perma.cc/NHD6-BHPK]
(“In 2015, we continued to see record-setting fines . . . against financial institutions for
violations of BSA/AML . . . laws.”).
113. See, e.g., Press Release, FinCEN, JPMorgan Admits Violation of the Bank Secrecy
Act for Failed Madoff Oversight; Fined $461 Million by FinCEN (Jan. 7, 2014),
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/jpmorgan-admits-violation-bank-secrecyact-failed-madoff-oversight-fined-461 [perma.cc/FC7X-Q3QW] (fining JP Morgan $2.05
billion for violating the BSA by failing to report suspicious transactions arising from the
Bernie Madoff Scandal); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and
HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit
$1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-antimoney-laundering-and-sanctions-violations [perma.cc/R5CQ-ZNWQ] (fining HSBC about
$1.9 billion for violations of the BSA, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
and the Trading with the Enemy Act).
114. Press Release, FinCEN, FinCEN Penalizes W. Va. Bank for Serious BSA Violations
and Actions by a Branch Manager That Assisted Criminal Activity (Jun. 15, 2015),
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-penalizes-west-virginia-bankserious-bsa-violations-and-actions-branch [perma.cc/58CF-XAVV].
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about seventy-three percent of its equity capital.115 In addition to
monetary penalties, the Department of Justice will also impose
costly independent monitors on non-compliant banks to ensure
BSA compliance.116 In an extreme case, Riggs Bank in Washington,
D.C. faced such intense scrutiny from regulators that it was forced
to shut down its more scrutinized business with embassies, and the
bank was shut down and sold to PNC Bank.117
Further exacerbating the costs of penalties, examiners take a
highly subjective approach in determining whether a bank has
complied with AML regulations. 118 Financial institution officials
may reasonably disagree with regulators on the risks posed by
certain customers and the extent to which financial institutions
must go to verify a customer’s identity. 119 Yet, regulators may
sanction financial institutions whose officials believed they were
taking reasonable steps in a risk-based approach.120 For example,
in a GAO report, one financial institution reported that a BSA
examiner questioned the way the financial institution was rating
the risk of two countries on the firm’s risk matrix, but “did not
provide a basis for believing that certain countries should be
higher on the firm’s risk ranking.”121
c. AML Regulations lead to Financial Institution De-Risking
Another cost imposed by the BSA is that some financial
institutions pursue a policy of de-risking, which is the termination
of product lines or relationships with categories of high-risk
115. See Brown-Hruska, supra note 112, at 8.
116. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. HSBC Bank USA N.A., No.
1:12-cr-763,
15-17
(E.D.N.Y.
Dec.
11,
2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/12/11/dpa-executed.pdf
[perma.cc/W2KB-UP7A] (imposing a 5-year monitorship on HSBC as part of its deferred
prosecution agreement).
117. See Associated Press, PNC agrees to buy troubled Riggs bank, NBC NEWS (Jul. 16,
2004,
2:01
PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5451203/ns/businessus_business/t/pnc-agrees-buy-troubled-riggs-bank/ [perma.cc/ZY96-9MLW]; see also
Paul S. Pilecki & Michael A. Mancusi, Riggs Order Articulates Bank Secrecy Act Compliance
Requirements, J. OF INV. COMPLIANCE, 2004, at 85; Riggs Bank Fined $25 Million, TELLERVISION,
2004, at 3.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 119-21.
119 . USA PATRIOT ACT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE COULD IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
REGULATIONS RELATED TO CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION AND INFORMATION SHARING PROCEDURES,
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 23-24 (2005).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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customers to reduce AML risk, 122 as a response to increased
regulatory scrutiny.123 If a bank cannot determine if a transaction
is legitimate, it may err on the side of caution124 and opt to stop
working with businesses that draw scrutiny.125 This can result in
mass customer exit programs where banks terminate existing
relationships and cut ties with whole sectors or client types, 126
such as embassies, money service businesses, and foreign
correspondent banks due to the higher risk of money laundering
they present.127 Many smaller banks have also restricted access to
international customers 128 and have scaled back their
international remittance businesses due to the risk of assisting
money transfers in higher-risk countries.129 One of the pitfalls of
de-risking however, is that as large banks leave higher risk areas
customers will migrate to smaller institutions that lack resources
and expertise to manage the risk and who are pressed for sources
of revenue.130 Further, de-risking inhibits charities from servicing
122. See Bukola Adisa, AML De-Risking: An effective method of plugging AML control
failures? Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists 3 (2014), AML DeRisking: An effective method of plugging AML control failures? Association of Certified
Anti-Money Laundering Specialists.
123. Id. at 4 (noting that many financial institutions de-risk to plug deficiencies due
to the increased costs of penalties and fines); see also supra Part II.B.2 (detailing the costs
of AML compliance and failure to financial institutions).
124. Alan Kline, Small Banks Suffering Too in ‘Derisking’ Push, AM. BANKER, Dec. 26,
2014.
125. Id.
126. Adisa, supra note 122.
127. Id.; see also Kline, supra note 124 (noting some banks “might not be comfortable
banking casinos, marijuana dispensaries, payday lenders or others that could be perceived
as fronts for money laundering.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANK SECRECY ACT:
DERISKING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR REGULATORS TO ENHANCE
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS 18-19 (2018) (noting de-risking as a factor responsible for account
terminations and branch closures in the southwest border region).
128. See Laura Thompson Osuri, Small Banks in Fla. Lash Out on BSA, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 2, 2005, at 1.
129. See Andy Peters, Too Hot to Handle, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2015, at 10. These higher
risk geographic areas can include countries identified as sponsoring terrorism, countries
with weak AML regulatory regimes of their own, or areas in the United States known to
have a high degree of drug trafficking. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note
29, at 21-22.
130. See Adisa, supra note 122, at 16; see also Tracy Durner & Liat Shetret,
Understanding De-Risking and its Effects on Financial Inclusion, GLOB. CTR ON COOP. SEC. 19
(2015),
https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rr-bank-derisking-181115-en.pdf [perma.cc/46Y7-JVTV] (“As a result, those riskier businesses are
becoming customers of smaller banks. This is cause for concern, since smaller institutions
are less likely to have the stringent controls that their larger competitors have in place.”).
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higher risk international regions that are poor or facing
humanitarian crises, which can exacerbate those problems.131
C. Lawyer’s Roles in Regulating AML
Unlike financial institutions, American lawyers currently selfregulate the enforcement of AML risks. Their regulations are more
patchwork than financial institution AML regulations. Lawyers
regulate AML risks through ethical requirements, existing criminal
statutes, education efforts, and the ABA’s “Voluntary Good
Guidance for Lawyers” (the “Voluntary Guidance”).
1. Professional Ethics Requirements and Criminal Statutes
While American lawyers are not obligated to comply with
BSA/AML regulations, they are still first and foremost governed by
existing money laundering statutes.132 Attorneys who participate
in the laundering of illicit funds for their clients can be held
criminally liable for money laundering133 and can have their legal
fees subject to forfeiture. 134 Attorneys also cannot shield
themselves from liability through “willful ignorance” of their
client’s bad deeds.135
Additionally, state ethical requirements mandate that lawyers
not assist their clients in conduct the attorney knows to be criminal

131. See Durner & Shetret, supra note 130, at 20-21.
132. Lawton P. Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical
Study of Attorney Facilitation of Money Laundering through Commercial Transactions, 2011
J. PROF. L. 1, 14 (2011).
133. See, e.g., United States v. King, 865 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding a money
laundering conviction of an attorney who offered to launder funds).
134. Cummings & Stepnowsky, supra note 132, at 18; see also Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (“[N]o lawyer, in any case, . . . has the
right to . . . accept stolen property, or . . . in payment of a fee. . . . The privilege to practice
law is not a license to steal.”) (citing Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d 672, 677 (10th Cir.
1936)).
135. See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 755-56 (2011)
(describing the concept of “willful blindness,” noting that defendants who “subjectively
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists” and who “take deliberate actions
to avoid learning of that fact” can be found to have acted “knowingly or willfully.”); see also
United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154-55 (3d. Cir. 2006) (an attorney was criminally
convicted of money laundering based on a theory of “willful blindness” because he ignored
numerous red flags including the client using false social security numbers, the large
amount of transactions without apparent commercial justification, and inquiries from the
lawyer’s accountant as to the suspicious nature of the transactions).
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or fraudulent 136 and withdraw from the representation if it will
result in the violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
laws.137 A lawyer “may” also withdraw from representation if the
client uses the lawyer for services that the lawyer reasonably
believes to be criminal or fraudulent or if “the client has used the
lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud.” 138 Further, a
lawyer may reveal information relating to a representation to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent a crime
or fraud or prevent, mitigate or rectify financial harm to another
that resulted from a client’s crime or fraud.139
However, a lawyer is not mandated to withdraw from
representation unless the lawyer has actual knowledge that his or
her client committed a crime or fraud and the lawyer is not
required to disclose any information related to that fraud or
crime.140 Therefore, a lawyer may continue to “ethically” represent
a client he or she reasonably believes to be committing a crime and
it is not required by ABA regulations to disclose the client’s
wrongdoing even after discovered. 141 The ABA has, however,
issued an opinion that lawyers are in compliance with ethical
requirements if they implement a risk-based approach to identify
and detect money laundering and terrorist financing in compliance
with the Voluntary Guidance. 142 Finally, lawyers are already
required to report to the IRS the receipt of currency “over
[US]$10,000, on reports (IRS Form 8300) that require the lawyer
to disclose the source of the payment and whether that source is a
client.”143

136. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also Gregory,
supra note 3, at 43.
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
138. Id. r. 1.16(b)(2)-(3).
139. Id. r. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
140. Id. r. 1.6(b)(2)-(3), 1.16(b)(2)-(3) (noting that both rules use the word “may,”
not “must” or “shall”).
141. See id. r. 1.6(b)(2)-(3), 1.16(b)(2)-(3).
142. ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 463 (2013); see
also infra Part II.C.3 (providing details on the “Voluntary Good Guidance for Lawyers”).
143. A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., Comments of the ABA Task
Force on Gatekeeper Regulations and the Profession on the Financial Action Task Force
Consultation
Paper
dated
May
30,
2002,
A.B.A.
9
(2002),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/krauland.pdf
[perma.cc/X6ZSNFLF]; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6050-I (2018).
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2. Education Programs
The ABA also works to educate practicing attorneys on money
laundering, terrorist financing, and how attorneys can avoid
unwittingly assisting in these activities.144 The educational efforts
have included “the development of policy statements, continuing
legal education (CLE) sessions, articles, casebook discussions, and
state bar web page articles or links.”145 These efforts have largely
targeted attorneys who work in the fields identified by the FATF’s
recommendations as involving activities that should be subject to
AML requirements 146 including, lawyers who handle real estate
matters, trusts and estates, international practice, and corporate
formation and management. 147 There have also been efforts to
educate ethics experts who provide advice regarding risk
management and rule compliance, such as general counsel in law
firms and legal ethics academics.148
Additionally, the ABA has worked to promote the Voluntary
Guidance,149 which was created by the ABA to educate American
attorneys on money laundering and terrorist financing to assist
them in “designing and implementing effective risk-based
approaches.”150 These efforts have included putting the Voluntary
144. See Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat Money Laundering &
Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 487, 502 (2015); see also Int’l Bar Ass’n et al., A
Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering, A.B.A. 2 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguid
e_preventingmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf [perma.cc/3CKS-VL5L] (“This Guide is
intended as a resource to be used by lawyers and law firms to highlight the ethical and
professional concerns relating to AML and to help lawyers and law firms comply with their
legal obligations in countries where they apply.”); see also Gregory, supra note 3, at 43
(describing efforts the ABA has made to develop education programs for lawyers on
money laundering risks and “help lawyers render legal services in accordance with
practices intended to deter actual money launderers and terrorist financiers from
engaging the legal profession.”).
145. See Terry, supra note 144, at 503.
146. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 7, ¶ 22(d).
147. See Terry, supra note 144, at 504-05.
148. See id. at 505.
149. See infra Part II.C.3 (providing details on the “Voluntary Good Guidance for
Lawyers”).
150. See A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., Voluntary Good Practices
Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,
A.B.A.
2
3
(2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_n
ewsletter/crimjust_taskforce_gtfgoodpracticesguidance.authcheckdam.pdf
[perma.cc/SQS4-QGGL].
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Guidance in CLE sessions, placing the guidance on bar association
websites, publishing stories in the ABA Journal, and encouraging
professional responsibility academics to teach the guidance to law
students.151 The hope is that, while it is unlikely education alone
can stop lawyers from intentionally committing or assisting money
laundering, 152 the educational resources provided can help
lawyers avoid unwittingly assisting clients in money laundering.153
3. Voluntary Good Guidance for Lawyers
The Voluntary Guidance was adopted by the ABA in 2010 and
supported by the US Department of Treasury, 154 partially in
response to anticipation that the legal profession might face
mandatory federal regulation in this area due to international
pressure from the FATF. 155 The Voluntary Guidance is a manual
intended to educate lawyers on assessing the risk that a client may
be laundering funds with the lawyer’s assistance.156 The Voluntary
Guidance is modeled after the FATF’s Lawyer’s Guidance, targeting
the same types of lawyers and recommending the same AML
approach.157
However, unlike the Lawyer’s Guidance, 158 the Voluntary
Guidance is not a mandatory regulatory requirement and is only
meant as a voluntary educational tool to help lawyers address their
own risks of unwittingly assisting money laundering or terrorist
financing. 159 If a lawyer determines that a client presents an
unacceptable risk, the Voluntary Guidance only recommends that
the lawyer comply with ethics requirements and terminate the

151. See Terry, supra note 144, at 508.
152. See id. at 502 (“If the vast network of federal criminal laws and enforcement
mechanisms are insufficient to deter intentional criminal acts by lawyers, it is unlikely that
any additional efforts by the profession would deter such conduct.”).
153. See id.
154. See A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., supra note 150, at iii.
155. See id. at 2-3; see also Terry, supra note 144, at 508.
156. Cummings, supra note 132, at 20.
157. Compare A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., supra note 150,
with Fin. Action Task Force, RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals 15 (2008),
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20professions.pdf

[perma.cc/4TVF-E63F].
158. See generally Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157.
159. See A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., supra note 150, at 3.
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representation.160 There is no penalty in the Voluntary Guidance
that would apply to lawyers who do not adopt the risk-based
approach.161 Further, while the FATF does not mandate suspicious
activity reporting, it encourages individual jurisdictions to apply
their own suspicious activity reporting rules. 162 The Voluntary
Guidance conversely does not recommend any reporting
requirement.163
There are, however, critics who note that the Voluntary
Guidance is not sufficient to accomplish its goal.164 The guidance is
voluntary and there are no consequences for disregarding its
provisions. 165 The guidance is also not actually that well known
among lawyers, meaning that it cannot even have its intended
effect of educating lawyers on how to reduce risks of inadvertently
assisting clients in money laundering or terrorist financing. 166
Therefore, further action must be taken for the Voluntary Guidance
to be effective.
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH TO REGULATING
ATTORNEY MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS
Internationally, one solution to curtail money laundering has
been to expand the scope of AML regulations to encompass other
industries beyond traditional financial institutions. 167 In the
United States, this has meant expanding the BSA to target
additional industries such as casinos, card clubs, and money

160. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(2)-(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1983).
161. See A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., supra note 150.
162. See infra text accompanying note 245.
163. See generally A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., supra note 150.
164 . See Glob. Legal Grp., International Comparative Legal Guide to: Anti-Money
Laundering, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 6 (2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Brooker-and-Cohen-Anti-Money-Laundering-2018-ICGL2018.pdf [perma.cc/5H6B-7KJR].
165. See id. (internal citation) (“The ABA voluntary guidance is a joke because there
are no consequences, unless you’re prosecuted, and that happens once every five years.”).
166. See id. (internal citation) (“If you went out and asked lawyers, ‘Have you ever
heard of these voluntary guidelines?’ 99 percent will say they have never heard of them.”).
167. See supra Part I.
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service businesses. 168 Internationally, however, this has also
meant expanding the regulations to include lawyers.169
As mentioned briefly above, the United Kingdom has
expanded AML regulations to cover attorneys. 170 The United
Kingdom first extended the AML requirement to transactional
attorneys when it passed the POCA and the Money Laundering
Regulations of 2003 in response to a directive from the European
Commission. 171 These regulations first required transactional
attorneys to perform due diligence on their clients and report
reasonable suspicions of money laundering to the National
Criminal Intelligence Service. 172 In 2007, the United Kingdom
furthered its AML regulations of the legal profession by adopting
the Regulations 2007 to implement the requirements of the
European Union’s Third Money Laundering Directive and FATF 40
Recommendations, which took a risk-based approach to AML
regulations.173
The model for the United Kingdom’s regulation of attorneys
was originally developed by the FATF, 174 an inter-governmental
body established by the G-7 nations,175 responsible for setting and
promoting international AML standards.176 As part of its mandate,
168 . See generally Bank Secrecy Act, 31 C.F.R. § 1020-1030 (2010) (listing the
different types of entities that FinCEN regulates).
169. See Glob. Legal Grp., supra note 164, at 2; see also Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardians
at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and The Risk-Based Approach For Transactional
Lawyers, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 607, 622 (2009).
170. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 12.
171. See Cummings & Stepnowsky, supra note 132, at 15-16; see also John A. Terrill
II & Michael A. Breslow, The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing: Lessons from the English Approach, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 433, 438 (2015).
172. Cummings & Stepnowsky, supra note 132, at 16.
173. See Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 171 at 438; see also The Money Laundering
Regulations 2007, Explanatory Memorandum ¶¶ 2.1, 4.1 (Eng.). The European Union’s
Third Money Laundering Directive was implemented to bring AML Regulations among
European Union Member States into compliance with the FATF’s most recent
recommendations. See Council Directive 2005/60, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC). The FATF
recommendations that further explained these AML requirements are discussed further
below. See infra Part III.B.
174. See The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 173, ¶ 7.1.
175. See Fin. Action Task Force, Who we are, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/K8YU-L6BG] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020); see also Fin. Action Task Force,
History of the FATF, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/ [perma.cc/RE6ZQ3AA] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
176. See id.
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the FATF releases a series of recommendations, which set out a
comprehensive framework of AML regulations that individual
countries can and do use177 to create their own AML frameworks
adapted for their specific circumstances.178 Beginning in 2003, the
FATF first began including recommendations that lawyers, among
other non-financial businesses and professionals (“DNFBPs”), be
covered under AML/CFT regulations. 179 The FATF noted an
“‘increasing concern’ that money laundering schemes involve the
use of professionals” such as lawyers to act as financial
intermediaries or provide expert advice.180 The concern was that
their specialized expertise allowed them to create corporate
vehicles, trusts, and other legal arrangements that can facilitate
money laundering.181 Lawyers were also noted to be in a unique
position to observe and identify potentially suspicious activities,
but they were subject to confidentiality commitments that underlie
the very relationships that allowed them to perform these roles.182
177. See Fin. Action Task Force, Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, 3 (2020),
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf
[perma.cc/6M9S-G4P5] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
178. See Fin. Action Task Force, The FATF Recommendations, http://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html
[perma.cc/94EV-PCA5] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
179. See Fin. Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Ann. Rep.: 2002–2003, 1 (June
20, 2003), https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/2789358.pdf [perma.cc/E9MZ-RXW6].
FATF’s general movement to expand the umbrella of AML/Terrorist Financing regulations
to other Designated Non-Financial Professional Businesses (“DNFPBs”) includes not just
lawyers, but also casinos, real estate agents, accountants, notaries, and trust and company
service providers. See, e.g., Ann. Rep.: 2002–2003, supra, at 1; see also Shepherd, supra note
169, at 622 (noting that the FATF added DNFPBs to the 2003 FATF Recommendations
without sufficient input from the ABA).
180. See Shepherd, supra note 169, at 620; see also Fin. Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, Ann. Rep.: 2001–2002, 18 (June 21, 2002) http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2001%202002%20ENG.pdf [perma.cc/FQ3CCANQ] (noting the increased use by criminals of DNFBPs in laundering funds); Ann. Rep.:
2002–2003, supra note 179, at 6 (“[F]or a number of years the FATF has observed a
displacement effect, whereby money launderers seek to use businesses or professions
outside the financial sector, due to the preventive measures being put in place in the
financial sector.”).
181. See Fin. Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Review of the FATF Forty
Recommendations
Consultation
Paper,
¶
272
(May
30,
2002),
http://www.antiguagaming.gov.ag/Money%20Laundering/FATF%2040%20Review.pdf
[perma.cc/GK77-VJ4V].
182. Aaron R. Hutman et al., Money Laundering Enforcement and Policy, 39 INT’L LAW.
649, 660 (2005); see also Fed’n of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney Gen.),
[2013] B.C.C.A. 147, para. 93 (Can.) (“Lawyers often have specific knowledge of their
clients’ activities and the circumstances surrounding the transaction in question.”).
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The FATF further noted that criminals will sometimes use lawyerclient accounts for the placement and layering of funds directly,
which offers the launderer even further privilege protection.183
A. United Kingdom Application of Lawyer’s Guidance
1. UK’s AML Regime
a. Money Laundering Regulations 2007
The two central pieces of legislation in the United Kingdom
that address AML/CFT regulations are the Regulations 2007 and
POCA. 184 The Regulations 2007 establish CDD requirements for
relevant persons, which includes “independent legal
professionals” carrying out the Lawyer’s Guidance’s five specified
activities. 185 The Regulations 2007 also adopted the risk-based
approach and CDD requirements outlined by the Lawyer’s
Guidance, including identifying the beneficial ownership of a
client. 186 The Regulations 2007 define a beneficial owner as an
individual who owns more than twenty-five percent of the
interest, 187 or otherwise exercises control over the entity or
trust; 188 or, if the legal entity or arrangement is not a corporate
body, partnership, or trust, an individual who benefits from or
controls at least twenty-five percent of the property of the
entity.189
If the solicitor190 is unable to perform the CDD requirements
to identify the customer and beneficial owner before the business
183. See Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations Consultation Paper, supra note
181, ¶ 272.
184. See generally Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 171.
185. See infra text accompanying note 218; see also The Money Laundering
Regulations 2007, SI 2007/2157, art. 3, ¶ 9 (Eng.).
186. Compare The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, supra note 185, ¶ 2, with
Part III.B. (discussing the Lawyer’s Guidance risk assessment and implementation
requirements).
187. See The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, supra note 185, art. 6, ¶¶ 1-3.
188. See id.
189. See id. art. 6, ¶ 6 (“[W]here the individuals who benefit from the entity or
arrangement have yet to be determined, [the beneficial owner is] the class of persons in
whose main interest the entity or arrangement is set up or operates.”).
190. The UK has a division of two distinct legal professions, Solicitors and Barristers.
Barristers are primarily advocates who have virtual monopoly rights on trial work in the
higher courts and Solicitors are primarily office lawyers who advise clients, negotiate and
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relationship or transaction begins,191 the solicitor may not begin
either the business relationship or transaction. 192 After
establishing the relationship, the solicitor is still required to
monitor ongoing transactions to ensure they are consistent with
the practitioner’s “knowledge of the customer, his business[,] and
risk profile.”193 The Regulations 2007 also require that solicitors
keep CDD records for five years, 194 maintain policies and
procedures relating to their CDD program, 195 and ensure all
relevant employees are trained in AML/CFT laws and policies.196
b. Proceeds of Crime Act
POCA imposes criminal penalties on individuals who
participate in money laundering or who become aware of or
suspect money laundering and fail to report it. 197 POCA further
makes it a crime to conceal criminal property; 198 enter into an
arrangement one knows or suspects involves the control of
criminal property; 199 or acquire, use, or have possession of
criminal property.200 However, solicitors who disclose suspicious
activity to the government and seek consent to proceed are
draft documents, interview witnesses, and prepare cases that will be tried by Barristers.
Maimon Schwarzschild, The English Legal Professions: An Indeterminate Sentence, 10 FED.
SENT’G REP. 253, 253 (1998).
191. However, the verification may be completed “during the establishment of” the
business relationship if it is “necessary not to interrupt the normal conduct of business”
and “there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing occurring.” See The
Money Laundering Regulations 2007, supra note 185, art. 9, ¶ 3.
192. See id. art. 11, ¶ 1. However, this rule does not apply “where a lawyer or other
professional adviser is in the course of ascertaining the legal position for his client or
performing his task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning, legal
proceedings, including advice on the institution or avoidance of proceedings.” See id. art.
11, ¶ 2.
193. See id. art. 8, ¶¶ 1-3.
194. See id. art. 19, ¶¶ 1-3.
195. See id. art. 20.
196. See id. art. 21.
197. See Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 171, at 442; see also Proceeds of Crime Act
2002, c. 29 (U.K.).
198. See Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, § 327 (U.K.); see also Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002, c. 29, § 340 (U.K.) (defining criminal conduct as conduct that “constitutes an
offence in any part of the United Kingdom” and criminal property as property that
constitutes “a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit” and
the offender “knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.”).
199. See id. § 328.
200. See id. § 329.
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provided a legal defense for continuing their work.201 A solicitor’s
failure to disclose does not require that the solicitor actively
participated in the conduct, and it even applies if the solicitor
declined the representation.202 It is also criminal for a solicitor to
“tip off” a client that a disclosure has been made and an
investigation is ongoing 203 or “prejudice an investigation” by
making a disclosure likely to obstruct the investigation.204
To balance the requirement that solicitors report on their
client’s activities with the ethical obligation of attorney
confidentiality, POCA includes exceptions to preserve privilege for
these criminal sanctions. 205 The key question is whether the
solicitor
obtained
client
information
in
privileged
206
circumstances, or in connection with providing legal advice or
in connection with a legal proceeding. 207 This does not include
information communicated to a solicitor for a criminal purpose.208
When a client seeks a solicitor’s advice with criminal intent, and
the solicitor suspects money laundering, that solicitor must
disclose under POCA and file a SAR. 209 The standard for the
crime/fraud exception to be applied is if a solicitor either knows
the transaction he is working on is a principal offense210 or knows
of prima facie evidence that his services are being used to further
a crime. 211 However, there is an exception to this exception,
allowing a solicitor to claim a reasonable excuse defense if he
genuinely, but mistakenly, believed that privilege applied.212
201. See id. §§ 327(2)(a), 328(2)(a), 329(2)(a); see also Terrill II & Breslow, supra
note 171, at 445.
202. Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 171, at 447-48.
203. Id. at 448 (citing Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, §§ 330A(1), 330A(3) (U.K.)).
204. See Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, § 342(2) (U.K.).
205. See Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 171, at 449-50; see also Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002, c. 29, § 330(6) (U.K.) (discussing the exception for a failure to disclose), Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, § 333D(2) (U.K.) (discussing an exception for tipping off),
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, § 342(3)(c) (U.K.).
206. Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 171, at 449 (citing Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,
c. 29, § 330(6) (U.K.)).
207. Id. (citing Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, § 330(10) (U.K.)).
208. Id.; see also Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, § 330(11) (U.K.).
209. Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 171, at 451; see also Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,
c. 29, § 330(b)(6) (U.K.).
210. Legal Sector Affinity Group, Anti-Money Laundering: Guidance for the Legal
Sector, THE L. SOC’Y ¶ 7.4.5 (2018) (“If you know the transaction you’re working on is a
principal offence, you risk committing an offence yourself.”).
211. Id. ¶ 7.4.5 (citing O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581).
212. Id. ¶ 7.4.5.
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B. The FATF’s “Lawyer’s Guidance”
To understand how lawyers in the United Kingdom regulate
AML risks using the risk-based approach, it is important to
examine the FATF’s guidance, which was the basis for the United
Kingdom’s approach. 213 The Lawyer’s Guidance was adopted
during a 2008 plenary meeting in Rio de Janeiro in response to the
FATF’s concerns of lawyer’s services being used to facilitate money
laundering. 214 This guidance was meant to indicate how an
effective risk-based approach should be designed and was meant
to be read in conjunction with the FATF’s Recommendations.215
1. Overview of the “Lawyer’s Guidance”
The Lawyer’s Guidance outlines the risk factors that lawyers
need to account for in developing a risk-based system.216 It is not
prescriptive and should be applied based on each country’s unique
circumstances, accounting for how the legal profession in each
country is regulated.217 It only applies to lawyers who prepare for
and carry out transactions concerning one or more of the FATF’s
Recommendation’s five specified activities, including: (1) real
estate transactions; (2) client money and securities management;
(3) the management of bank savings and securities accounts; (4)
contribution organization for the creation, operation or
management of companies; or (5) the creation, operation, or
management of legal arrangements, and buying and selling of
business entities. 218 However, lawyers who provide services or
advice peripheral to the overall transaction are not considered to

213 . See The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, Explanatory Memorandum 1
(Eng.) (explaining that the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 were implemented to
make U.K. money laundering regulations better reflect the FATF 40 Recommendations).
214. See Shepherd, supra note 169, at 626-47; see also Fin. Action Task Force, supra
note 157, at 4 (“After further international consultation with both public and private
sectors, the FATF adopted this [Legal Professional] Guidance at its October 2008
Plenary.”).
215. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 4-7.
216. See Shepherd, supra note 169, at 647-48; see also generally Fin. Action Task
Force, supra note 157.
217. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 15.
218. See id. at 6-7; see also Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 7, ¶ 22(d).
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be preparing for or carrying out the transaction and therefore, are
not required to observe AML obligations.219
Illustrating the determination of which lawyers are covered
by the Lawyer’s Guidance, Kevin Shepherd, a real estate attorney
practitioner, offers an example of a local real estate lawyer who
advises on local law issues for a “purchase of a multistate real
property portfolio.”220 The portfolio transaction involves property
in ten states, but the local lawyer is approached to only advise on
potential legal issues in California. 221 The local lawyer never
represented the client in the past, never met the client, and only
sends her invoices to the referring attorney.222 The local attorney
still runs a conflict check, which comes back satisfactory. 223
Shepherd concludes that the local counsel’s role is peripheral and
not preparing for or carrying out the transaction, so she need not
verify the client’s beneficial ownership.224
2. Risk Assessment under the “Lawyer’s Guidance”
The Lawyer’s Guidance maps out the implementation of the
risk-based approach in three steps: (1) assessing the risks of the
lawyer’s practice, (2) performing due diligence on customers
based on those risks, and (3) implementing internal controls to
ensure an effective risk-based approach.225 Initially, the law firm
should assess its risk through three categories: the
country/geographic, client, and service risks. 226 There is no
universal definition of a country’s risk, but some indicators of risk
include (1) the existence of “sanction, embargoes, or similar
measures” issued by bodies such as the United Nations; (2) lax

219. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 7; see also Fin. Action Task Force,
supra note 157, at 30 (“Subject to other factors . . . providing limited legal services in the
capacity of a local or special counsel may . . . mean that the legal professional is not
“preparing for” or “carrying out” a transaction for a regulated activity specified in
Recommendation 12.”).
220. See Shepherd, supra note 169, at 659.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 659-60.
224. See id. at 660.
225. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 25-35.
226. Though, the Lawyer’s Guidance notes that these categories are only the most
“commonly identified risk categories” and that “there is no universally accepted set of risk
categories.” See id.

1420

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:5

AML/CFT laws; or (3) the existence of significant corruption. 227
Clients whose activities may indicate a higher risk include cash
intensive clients, clients using intermediaries not subject to
adequate AML/CFT laws, or clients conducting business in unusual
circumstances.228 Further, the lawyer should assess the context of
the services being offered, accounting for any mitigating
circumstances that would warrant increased risk assessment.229
The Lawyer’s Guidance also includes another “variable” risk
factor, accounting for the “differences in practices, size, scale and
expertise, amongst legal professionals.” 230 A significant factor is
whether the proposed work would be unusual or suspicious for the
particular legal professional.231 This risk factor allows the lawyer
to tailor their risk assessment to the size and scope of their own
individual practice.232 For example, one of the factors potentially
triggering a higher risk assessment includes services to improperly
conceal beneficial ownership information; 233 however, for real
estate attorneys, concealing a beneficial owner for a real estate
developer seeking to purchase adjoining land parcels through
fictitious names to avoid price-run ups may not be untoward.234
Additionally, another risk factor is for services that deliberately
depend upon more anonymity regarding client identity than is
normal under the circumstances, 235 but for a sophisticated
transactional attorney, tiered ownership structures created for
legitimate tax and liability reasons may be normal.236
3. Application of Risk-Based Approach
After the risk assessment, the lawyer should perform CDD,
which enables a legal professional to form a reasonable belief
about the true identity of each client. 237 The standard diligence
227. See id. at 26.
228. See id. at 28.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 29.
231. See id at 31-32.
232. See id. at 29-31 (listing the factors to account for in the assessment of variable
risk).
233. See id. at 28.
234 . See Shepherd, supra note 169, at 655-56 (noting that if the landowners
discovered the true beneficial owner had deep pockets, that might drive up the prices).
235. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 29.
236. See Shepherd, supra note 169, at 656-57.
237. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 31.
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should include procedures to: (1) identify and verify the client’s
identity, (2) identify and take reasonable measures to verify the
client’s beneficial owner, and (3) understand the client’s
circumstances and business.238 The CDD will be informed by the
initial risk assessment, and a practitioner may reduce the standard
level of due diligence “after consideration of appropriate risk
variables, and in recognized lower risk scenarios” such as in
representing publicly listed companies, financial institutions with
strong AML/CFT controls, or certain government entities. 239
Conversely, if the client is deemed higher risk, increased CDD or
enhanced due diligence may be warranted.240
Lawyers should then continually monitor clients for changing
risk factors, money laundering, or terrorist financing activity. 241
The nature of the monitoring depends on the type and size of the
firm, the AML/CFT risks identified, and the nature of the regulated
activity provided. 242 This monitoring is not meant to be a
deputation of legal professionals, but is instead only maintaining
awareness while working for a client. 243 The FATF originally
wanted to impose Suspicious Transaction Reporting (“STR”)
requirements on legal professionals, but after lawyer groups
argued that this would run afoul of attorney duties of
confidentiality and injure attorney-client relations, 244 the FATF
left the determination to countries to proscribe their own
regulatory requirements.245 The Lawyer’s Guidance acknowledges
that law firms “differ significantly from financial institutions in
terms of size,” noting that unlike financial institutions, many law
firms are much smaller and therefore, the framework for internal
controls should account for this difference. 246 The extent of the
AML/CFT controls needs to be proportionate to the risk of the
services offered, and legal professionals should examine their own
238. See id. at 32.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 31.
241. See id. at 32-33.
242. See id. at 32.
243. See id. at 32-33.
244. See Shepherd, supra note 169, at 635-36 (citing Memorandum from Edward
Manigault summarizing the Paris meeting (Apr. 29, 2008) (on file with author)).
245. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 33 ¶ 120.
246 . See id. at 34, ¶ 123. (“For a number of DNFBPs, a single person may be
responsible for the functions of front office, back office, money laundering reporting, and
senior management.”).
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practice’s profile in determining the nature and extent of the
controls.247
4. Ambiguity of the Risk-Based Approach under the Lawyer’s
Guidance
There is ambiguity, however, in when a legal professional is
preparing for and carrying out a specified activity, as the Lawyer’s
Guidance does not define these terms beyond explaining that legal
professionals providing “advice or services . . . peripheral to the
overall transaction” would not be subject to AML requirements.248
This determination should be made on a case-by-case basis with
consideration of the scope of the local counsel’s involvement in
relation to the overall transaction, though there is no bright line
rule as to when the services would be considered peripheral. 249
Once a lawyer determines that he has crossed the threshold to a
more central role in the transaction, the lawyer would then be
required to employ appropriate AML/CFT measures.250
The definition of the specified activities251 covered under the
Lawyer’s Guidance can also be ambiguous. For example, the
“[b]uying and selling of real estate” is not defined in either the
Lawyer’s Guidance or in the FATF Recommendations. 252 This
language does not address whether financing real estate
transactions or leasing activities fall within this category.253 The
risk factors themselves can also be ambiguous, such as what would
constitute “readily apparent inadequate consideration” for a
transaction under the Lawyer’s Guidance.254 Further, the Lawyer’s

247. See id. at 34-35, ¶ 125-26 (detailing the fourteen-point framework that law
firm’s internal controls should include).
248. See id. at 6-7, ¶ 13.
249. Kevin Shepherd provides several examples of different levels of involvement
and whether they constitute “preparing for and carrying out” a transaction, but he does
not define the degree of involvement that would reach that point. See Shepherd, supra note
169, at 668-69.
250. See id. at 668; see also FATF, Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 13, ¶ 49.
251. See supra Part III.B.1.
252. See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157; see also Fin. Action Task Force, supra
note 7.
253. Though, based on his discussion, Kevin Shepherd appears to believe that “leasing
activities” would not be covered under the “[b]uying and selling of real estate.” See
Shepherd, supra note 169, at 649-50.
254. See id. at 28.

2020]

THEY'RE WATCHING YOU

1423

Guidance does not explain if the determination of what is
inadequate should be made on an objective or subjective basis.255
C. ABA Opposition to AML Regulations for Lawyers
While the United Kingdom has adopted AML regulations for
its lawyers, 256 in the United States, the ABA opposes the
implementation of AML regulations on American legal
professionals. 257 The ABA argues that imposing such AML/CFT
requirements on American lawyers would injure the confidential
lawyer-client relationship and that it would “impose burdensome,
costly, and unworkable beneficial ownership reporting
requirements on small businesses, their lawyers, and states.” 258
The ABA also argues that the reporting requirements are
unnecessary because there are more effective regulatory tools that
have been developed by the legal profession and federal
government.259
The ABA claims that mandatory AML regulations would
disturb the bedrock principle of loyalty and confidentiality central
to the attorney-client relationship, which are critical for the
independence of American attorneys and our legal adversarial
system. 260 The vagueness of the STR and “no tipping off”
requirements combined with criminal sanctions would discourage

255. See id. at 656; see also Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 28.
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. See Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers, Key Points, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_poli
cy/independence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act/
[perma.cc/4ZWV-H6P2]
(last visited Mar. 29, 2020) [hereinafter Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers].
258. See id.; see also Letter from Kevin Shepherd to FinCEN on Department of the
Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking—Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions RIN 1506AB15, 77 Fed. Reg. 13046 (May 4, 2012) (on file with A.B.A.),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2012may4_custo
merduediligence_c.authcheckdam.pdf [perma.cc/2HNL-8QKR].
259. See Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers, supra note 257.
260. A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., supra note 143, at 7; see also
William C. Hubbard, Op-Ed: Confidentiality Versus Money-Laundering Laws, NAT’L L. J. (Mar.
10, 2015) (“[T]he American Bar Association . . . [believes] a voluntary, risk-based
compliance approach aimed at educating lawyers about how to detect and prevent [money
laundering and terrorist financing] works best and is far preferable to intrusive federal
regulation of the legal profession that would erode the attorney-client privilege and harm
clients.”).
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privileged communications.261 AML/CFT requirements could also
raise Sixth Amendment concerns that the right to effective
assistance of counsel could be jeopardized.262
Lawyer-client confidentiality ensures client candor and trust,
which are necessary for effective representation, and harming this
relationship will harm the ability of lawyers to effectively
represent their clients. 263 Lawyers may be forced to view each
client with suspicion due to the vagueness of the regulations and
the breadth of the underlying offenses. 264 There can be valid
personal and professional reasons for a desire for privacy,
including individuals who are concerned about “kidnapping,
personal safety, and identity theft” 265 or businesses concerned
about “trade secrets and business plans.” 266 Further,
confidentiality can protect a client’s profile in the community,
estate planning goals, or solicitations, both charitable and
noncharitable.267
The ABA also noted that information collected by the Internal
Revenue Service (the “IRS”) and financial institutions is already
adequate to fight money laundering and terrorist financing and
that the Voluntary Guidance developed by the ABA is sufficient to
regulate AML concerns among American lawyers without the
“burdensome and costly rules-based approach” of the Lawyer’s
Guidance.268 There are also already considerable consequences for
attorneys who commit money-laundering that are sufficient to

261. A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Reg. and the Prof., supra note 143, at 16 n.8
(noting that although the FATF exempts “privileged information” from STR requirements,
the distinction between privileged and non-privileged information is likely to be unclear).
262. See Blake Bryant Goodsell, Muted Advocacy: Money Laundering and the AttorneyClient Relationship in a Post 9/11 World, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 211, 225-26 (2009); see also
United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1995).
263. See Danielle Jasmin Kirby, The European Union’s Gatekeeper Initiative: The
European Union Enlists Lawyers in the Fight against Money Laundering & Terrorist
Financing, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261, 310 (2008) (quoting Patricia Shaughnessy, The New EU
Money-Laundering Directive: Lawyers as Gate-Keepers and Whistle-Blowers, 34 L. & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 25, 44 (2002)).
264. See id.
265. Duncan E. Osborne, The Financial Action Task Force and the Legal Profession, 59
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 421, 428-29 (2014).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 429.
268. See Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers, supra note 257.
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deter intentional wrongdoing.269 The ABA also argues that these
regulations would not appear to be effective as well, noting the
failure of SAR reporting under the BSA.270 In addition to the ABA,
the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe noted in 2011 that
there was no evidence from the FATF that lawyers were being
unwittingly targeted by launderers, except in circumstances where
a lawyers willfully participates in money-laundering.271
IV. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ADOPT AML
REQUIREMENTS FOR LAWYERS
The United States should not adopt AML requirements for
American lawyers like the United Kingdom, but should instead
continue with the ABA’s efforts to educate American attorneys
about money laundering risks and the risk-based approach. The
BSA has already proven to be a burdensome regulatory regime
with little apparent impact on the amount of money laundered in
the United States or globally, and these costs would likely be
exacerbated if applied to legal professionals in the United States.
Further, invading the sanctity of the attorney duty of
confidentiality could have adverse impacts on the independence of
the Bar. The current self-regulating approach taken to detect and
prevent money laundering facilitation among American attorneys
is sufficient to regulate money laundering in the United States.
269. See Terry, supra note 144, at 501-02 (noting that there is a vast network of
federal criminal laws and enforcement mechanisms” to deter intentional criminal acts and
therefore, the focus of AML efforts should be on education); see also Comment Letter on
Preliminary Reaction to Typologies Draft from Kevin L. Shepherd, Chair of ABA Task Force
on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, to John Carlson, Principal Administrator of
FATF Secretariat ¶2a, ¶1a (May 6, 2013) (on file with A.B.A.) (noting that complicit
criminal activity by legal professionals is unusual and not typical).
270. See Letter from Kevin Shepherd to John Carlson, supra note 269, ¶6 (“In the
United States the empirical or anecdotal evidence seems quite the opposite, with many
STRs being filed by financial institutions that never result in law enforcement action.”).
271 . See CCBE Response to the Commission, The Review of the Third Anti-Money
Laundering Directive, Council of Bars and Law Soc’ys of Eur., ¶3.2 (Sept. 9, 2010),
https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/ANTI_MONE
Y_LAUNDERING/AML_Position_papers/EN_AML_20111021_CCBE_Response_to_the_Com
mission_The_review_of_the_third_anti-money_laundering_Directive.pdf [perma.cc/S8TKMA7W] (noting further in ¶3.5 that even assuming legal professionals are targeted by
money launderers, “[e]xperience seems to suggest that the scale of the targeting is in fact
relatively low and the question must therefore be asked if a reporting duty is justified.”);
see also Osborne, supra note 265, at 428 (noting the FATF had no examples of attorneys
becoming unwittingly involved in a money laundering or terrorist financing scheme).
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A. Existing AML Regulations Have Not Proven To Be Sufficiently
Effective To Justify Expanding Them To Lawyers
The BSA has not been effective enough in reducing money
laundering in the United States to justify expanding its regulations
to the legal profession. The amount of money laundered globally
and in the United States annually has not been reduced by efforts
to regulate financial institutions, insurance companies, casinos,
and other industries 272 and the FATF’s evidence that lawyers
contribute significantly to global money laundering is inadequate
to justify imposing costs of billions of dollars on US law firms.273
Further, one of the reasons cited for expanding AML regulations to
lawyers is that individuals looking to launder money may approach
lawyers to create more complex entities to better hide their
activity 274 and use anonymous shell corporations to hide their
identity from law enforcement officers.275
The Lawyer’s Guidance specifically addresses this risk by
requiring that lawyers identify beneficial ownership when
performing due diligence. 276 However, the beneficial ownership
identification requirement under the United Kingdom’s approach
to regulating attorney money laundering risks is substantially
identical to the requirement now imposed on financial institutions
in the United States277 and contains the same problems.278 As with
US financial institutions, should a corporate shell in the United
Kingdom have no single owner with a twenty-five percent or
greater stake, the lawyer would not need to identify the owner of
the entity, but would need to only identify the individual who
controls the entity,279 who may not actually be the “true owner” of
the corporation’s assets.280
Shell corporations are also easy to form without legal
expertise,281 so adding these requirements may not accomplish the
272. See supra Section II.B.1.
273. See Council of Bars and Law Soc’ys of Eur., supra note 271; see also Am. Bar
Found., supra note 64.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 180-83.
275. See supra Section II.B.1.a.
276. See supra text accompanying note 238.
277. Compare supra text accompanying notes 187-89, with supra Section II.A.2.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
280. See supra text accompanying note 83.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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intended goal. Attorneys may sometimes aid suspicious
individuals in establishing anonymous shell corporations without
performing appropriate due diligence, 282 but banks have been
guilty of doing this as well, at least prior to the beneficial
ownership requirement. 283 Therefore, the new beneficial
ownership identification requirements on financial institutions
may help improve this problem without necessitating the
expansion of burdensome requirements to other industries.
Another issue is the potential for de-risking among law firms,
which is one of the ways financial institutions have responded to
the current AML regulatory scheme.284 For financial institutions,
de-risking can increase the possibility of money laundering as the
remaining institutions in an area are less capable of handling the
increased AML risks. 285 Law firms would likely face the same
problems. There is the additional issue that de-risking among law
firms could pose Sixth Amendment issues in certain industries,
within certain geographic areas, or even to certain clients 286 as
these individuals will be unable to solicit legal representation.
Further, scrutiny on international business and money transfers
has pushed smaller financial institutions away from international
customers,287 however, if applied to law firms, it could discourage
important work that lawyers do internationally in areas of human
rights, international development, and other pro bono matters.288
De-risking also poses implications for the independence of the
Bar and Judiciary because de-risking is done in response to
regulatory scrutiny.289 When regulators identify a certain area as
high risk, banks have responded by de-risking, as was the case for
the southwest border, money service businesses, embassies, and
282. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
283. See supra text accompanying note 75.
284. See supra Section II.B.2.c.
285. See Adisa, supra note 122, at 16.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27 (noting the types of sectors and
clients who have lost access to banking services).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
288. See Jones Day, Pro Bono and Public Service: Giving Back Worldwide 23 (2010)
(highlighting Jones Day’s economic development work in Rwanda); see also Orrick, Impact
Finance, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, https://www.orrick.com/Practices/ImpactFinance [perma.cc/DQ9U-GKMH] (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (highlighting Orrick’s Impact
Finance and Investment global Pro Bono work, which works to raise “the quality of life for
people in every part of the world.”)
289. See supra Section II.B.2.c.
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international customers. 290 This means the government could
push law firms, and especially smaller law firms, out of certain
industries or areas by imposing more scrutiny and more severe
penalties on firms that engage those areas.
Requiring attorneys to file SARS would also not improve the
current AML regulatory scheme. Financial institutions file millions
of SARs each year, 291 many of which do not result in a law
enforcement response. 292 If millions of SARs a year are only
producing about 1,200 money laundering convictions, 293 adding
more SAR filings will accomplish little. Beyond cost, requiring
lawyers to file SARs would fundamentally change the attorneys’
position in the US legal system as one of confidentiality and
privilege. 294 Forcing attorneys to look at every client with
suspicion could chill the attorney-client relationship, making
clients less candid and making it more difficult for lawyers to
represent their clients. 295 Disturbing this bedrock principle by
forcing attorneys to report on their client’s activity to the
government may be justifiable if there were some considerable
benefit, but there is not enough evidence that growing the pile of
unused SARs would generate any such benefit.296
Further, the United Kingdom’s efforts to expand money
laundering regulations to solicitors have failed to reduce the
amount of money laundered in the United Kingdom. While the
exact scale of money laundered in the United Kingdom cannot be
determined with certainty,297 there is still a significant amount of

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
See supra text accompanying note 51.
See Letter from Kevin Shepherd to John Carlson, supra note 269, ¶6.
See supra text accompanying note 67.
See supra text accompanying note 260.
See supra text accompanying note 264.
See Letter from Kevin Shepherd to John Carlson, supra note 269, ¶6.
See Hilary Osborne, UK vulnerable to money laundering on a massive scale, finds
MPs,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
7,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2019/mar/08/uk-vulnerable-to-money-laundering-on-a-massive-scale-find-mps
[perma.cc/DZ2K-LF87]; see also Anton Moisenko & Tom Keatinge, The Scale of Money
Laundering in the UK: Too Big to Measure?, ROYAL UNITED SERVS. INST. FOR DEF. & SEC. STUDIES
10
(2019),
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190211_moiseienko_and_keatinge_extent_of_mon
ey_laundering_web.pdf [perma.cc/S5PB-RK84] (“It is unlikely that the UK government or
researchers will be able to produce a comprehensive estimate of money laundering in the
UK.”).
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money laundered through the United Kingdom. 298 In fact, many
consider London to be the money laundering capital of the
world. 299 Without any evidence that the United Kingdom’s
expanded approach to regulating money laundering risks has
reduced the amount of money laundered in its economy, the United
States should not follow suit and risk billions of dollars in costs300
for an uncertain benefit.
B. The Expense Of Expanding AML Requirements To Lawyers Would
Be Significant
The cost of the current AML requirements on banks has been
significant301 and it would likely be the same for attorneys if they
are required to implement AML policies. Under the United
Kingdom’s approach, attorneys in the United States would be
required to comply with many of the same AML requirements as
financial institutions in the Unites States, including implementing
a risk-based analysis of customers, performing CDD, implementing
internal controls, and ensuring appropriate employee training on
how to identify and prevent money laundering and terrorist
financing. 302 Multiple studies have already found that AML
regulations are among the most significant that financial
institutions face,303 and those institutions already face numerous
burdensome regulations. 304 Law firms conversely, are typically

298. See Chris Stokel-Walker, Why the UK is losing its costly battle against money
laundering, WIRED (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/money-launderingin-the-uk-russian-banks [perma.cc/N4UW-KQN3]; see also Chris Stokel-Walker, New data
shows London’s property boom is a money laundering horror, WIRED (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/money-laundering-hmrc-tax-update [perma.cc/QTY9QGTT]; London’s financial flows are polluted by laundered money, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11,
2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/10/11/londons-financial-flows-arepolluted-by-laundered-money [perma.cc/7LU4-EEJE].
299. See Avinash D Persaud, London: the money laundering capital of the world,
PROSPECT MAGAZINE (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/economicsand-finance/london-the-money-laundering-capital-of-the-world
[perma.cc/9WPVDKXC]; see also Nico Hines, London: The World’s Money Laundering Capital, DAILY BEAST
(Jul. 8, 2015), https://www.thedailybeast.com/london-the-worlds-money-launderingcapital [perma.cc/M4NJ-TTSS].
300. See supra Part II.B.2.
301. See supra Part II.B.2.
302. Compare supra Part III.B.3, with supra Part II.A.2.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
304. See Lux & Greene, supra note 104, at 23.
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regulated at the state level, 305 and imposing these onerous
regulatory burdens on them, which even major financial
institutions find burdensome, 306 would significantly change how
law firms operate and structure themselves. These costs would
then get passed down to clients, which would further restrict
access to affordable legal representation.
Law firms are also fundamentally structured differently than
financial institutions.307 While a majority of banking is performed
by a smaller number of large banks, 308 the number of lawyers
employed by small firms is significant.309 AML requirements have
had a disproportionate impact on small financial institutions 310
and if they were expanded to cover attorneys, this
disproportionate impact would be the norm of the industry. The
Lawyer’s Guidance does include variables in its analysis to account
for the different sizes of law firms, allowing them to account for
their lack of manpower in their approach to AML compliance;311
however, banks are also permitted to take a risk-based approach
in AML regulations312 and it has not helped them to avoid targeting
from regulators.313

305. See Rhonda McMillion, ABA and Other Bar Groups Work to Limit Federal
Regulation
of
Lawyers,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N
J.
(Dec.
2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/let_the_states_do_it_aba_working_to_limit
_federal_regulation_of_lawyers [perma.cc/SYW7-FQWJ].
306. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
307. See supra text accompanying note 246.
308. See Camden R. Fine, BankThink No, there aren’t too many banks in the U.S., AM.
BANKER (Oct. 25, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/no-therearent-too-many-banks-in-the-us [perma.cc/99AM-TB3E] (“Just 0.2% of U.S. banks hold
more than two-thirds of industry assets.”); see also Hester Peirce & Stephen Matteo Miller,
Small Banks by the Numbers, 2000 – 2004, MERCATUS CTR. (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/small-banks-numbers-2000-2014
[perma.cc/C6AR-BABA] (“Since the financial crisis, US banking assets and deposits have
continued a long trend of consolidation in a handful of large banks.”).
309. See Margaret Grisdela, Overview of the U.S. Legal Market, HG.ORG,
https://www.hg.org/marketing-us-market.html [perma.cc/HJ5D-JDQ2] (last visited Apr.
14, 2020) (“The vast majority of attorneys in private practice (70%) work in a law firm
with ten or fewer attorneys. In fact, a solo practice is the career and lifestyle choice of
almost half (48%) of private legal practitioners. Only 14% of attorneys work in firms with
more than 100 lawyers, according to the ABA.”).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
311. See, e.g., Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 29.
312. See supra Part II.A.1.
313. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
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Further, the variables in the Lawyer’s Guidance accounting for
the differences in sizes among law firms is vague and it is unclear
what the Lawyer’s Guidance means when it says that smaller
practices can take into account their smaller size in their risk
assessment. 314 Therefore, without more specific language, it is
likely that smaller practices will still feel pressure to expend
resources to “over-comply” with AML requirements. Further, a
significant number of these smaller firms are solo law practices,315
which would be hit even harder by these compliance and reporting
requirements.316
Beyond the financial costs, AML regulations have contributed
heavily to an increasing trend of consolidation in the financial
industry, as banks race to achieve efficient economies of scale to
address their growing regulatory burdens. 317 Pushing the legal
field onto the same path of mergers and consolidations that
smaller banks already face could adversely impact the availability
of access to legal representation. Additionally, banks already have
difficulty finding compliance specialists to work in their
institutions and aid with regulatory compliance. 318 It would be
even more difficult if the government increased the demands for
these services by imposing these requirements on many more
firms.
Another significant cost would be the cost of ambiguity and
uncertainty created by implementing a regulatory scheme based
on the United Kingdom. Financial institutions already face a
regulatory scheme in the BSA with significant unclarity, resulting
in those institutions being assessed as deficient due to a difference
of opinion between a regulator and a bank over how to categorize
certain risks. 319 This uncertainty would be exacerbated by the
United Kingdom’s approach because it is not even clear who the
underlying Lawyer’s Guidance covers, whereas the BSA more
clearly delineates the covered entities.320 Specifically, the Lawyer’s
Guidance defines covered attorneys as those preparing for or
314. See, e.g., Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 29.
315. See Grisdela, supra note 309.
316. See supra Part II.B.2.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
320. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(2018); compare Part III.B.4, with 31 U.S.C. §
5312(a)(2) (2018).
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carrying out a specified activity.321 This vague term would likely
result in law practices that would not be considered to be facing a
significant risk of money laundering, still implementing AML
policies and procedures out of an abundance of caution, which
could impose needless significant compliance costs on law firms
and invade people’s privacy with no benefit.322 Further, it means
that regulators will be able to stretch the definition of which legal
practitioners are covered by the AML requirements, allowing them
to impose significant penalties and fines323 on unsuspecting legal
professionals who believed they were not covered by the
regulations.
C. Current Measures Are Sufficient To Address AML Risks
Current measures in place are adequate to address AML risks
for attorneys. There is a vast array of criminal laws, enforcement
mechanisms, and ethical requirements that are already in place to
deter attorneys from willfully facilitating money laundering
schemes. 324 Attorneys are also subject to ethical requirements
beyond the regulatory requirements already imposed on
bankers, 325 which makes assisting a client in laundering funds
riskier, and subjects the attorney to more severe punishment. Like
bankers, attorneys are already subject to criminal sanction for
assisting money laundering.326 However, attorneys could also lose
their license to practice for assisting a client in laundering funds.327
Therefore, there are enough enforcement mechanisms to
discourage attorneys from willfully facilitating money laundering
and additional AML regulations would not dissuade individuals
who are not already deterred by the existing rules and
requirements.
As for attorneys who unwittingly assist in money laundering
schemes, there is already a standard in place to ensure that lawyers
address reasonable suspicions of criminal wrongdoing by their
clients and ensure that lawyers do not turn a blind eye to
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part III.B.4.
See supra Part II.B.2.b.
See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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misconduct.328 Some attorneys may not have enough experience to
understand the risks created by clients seeking to use their
services to advance a money laundering scheme, but this is an
educational problem that the Voluntary Guidance was meant to
address. 329 Imposing mandatory AML regulations on lawyers
would encourage them to better understand money laundering
risks, but imposing burdensome regulatory obligations and
criminal sanctions is not a cost-effective way to promote
educational material. While the ABA’s efforts to educate lawyers
about the Voluntary Guidance and money laundering risks330 have
not yielded significant results, 331 a more targeted approach may
lead to more lawyers understanding the guidance and being able
to use it without the significant costs 332 that would come with
mandatory AML regulations. One possible solution would be to
require lawyers within the fields of the specified activities 333 to
take CLE credits pertaining specifically to AML risks or the
Voluntary Guidance. This would also fix the problem that the
Voluntary Guidance itself is not well known.334 Using the Voluntary
Guidance to educate attorneys about the risks of money laundering
from clients, 335 while ensuring that those attorneys who turn a
blind eye to suspicious clients are penalized appropriately,336 is a
more efficient means to deal with this problem than imposing
burdensome regulatory requirements on law firms and placing
ambiguous requirements on them that could result in significant
penalties.337
Further, POCA’s balancing of privilege and reporting
requirements is inferior to how they are balanced in the United
States. In the United Kingdom, the standard for when a solicitor
must report on his client for suspected wrongdoing does not differ
significantly from the standard imposed on American lawyers. The
standard for solicitors is either “knowing” or having “prima facie
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See supra text accompanying note 135.
See supra Part II.C.3.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra text accompanying note 166.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 157, at 6-7.
See supra text accompanying note 166.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
See supra Part II.B.2; see also supra Part II.B.1.
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evidence” of wrongdoing. 338 However, American lawyers are
already under ethical requirements not to assist clients in activity
the lawyers know to be illicit339 and could face criminal charges if
they turned a blind eye to prima facie evidence of wrongdoing.340
Imposing a requirement to file a SAR in this scenario while also not
“tipping off” the client to the SAR,341 and at the same time making
the lawyer withdraw from the representation 342 would impose
contradictory obligations. If a lawyer is required to file a SAR, but
then tells the client that he suspects wrongdoing and must
withdraw from representation, then the lawyer has effectively
“tipped off” the client to the existence of a likely SAR filing. The
solution would be to either force the lawyer to continue
representing a criminal client, putting the lawyer in an
uncomfortable and costly situation, or force the lawyer to begin
lying to clients, which is disruptive to the foundational lawyerclient relationship.343 Allowing a lawyer to tell a client the truth
and withdraw from representation344 is a better approach, both for
the lawyer’s legal and ethical exposure, and for the protection of
the lawyer-client relationship.
Finally, the United States should protect the sanctity and
privilege of the lawyer client relationship that currently exists. The
lawyer-client confidential relationship was not meant to shield
clients from the law, but is instead meant to promote client candor
and trust which is necessary for effective legal representation.345
While the United Kingdom and the FATF both took efforts to limit
the breadth of AML regulations to limit the impact on attorneyclient confidentiality and privilege,346 the regulations they created
are still too vague and broad and would chill the attorney-client
relationship.347 Further, responding to the regulations necessitates
that lawyers view their clients in an adversarial nature, as their
338. See Legal Sector Affinity Group, supra note 211.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
340. See supra text accompanying note 135.
341. See Terrill, supra note 171, at 448 (citing Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, §§
330A(1), 330A(3) (U.K.)).
342. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
343. See supra text accompanying note 260.
344. See supra Part II.C.1.
345. See Kirby, supra note 263.
346. See supra Part III.B; see also supra Part III.A.
347. See supra text accompanying note 261.
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interests may no longer align, which only reduces the candor
between lawyers and their clients.348 There are many valid reasons
businesses and individuals might want privacy and confidentiality
ranging from the objectives of promoting business to simply
protecting themselves from financial harm. 349 The government
also has a history of losing sensitive data to hacks and leaks. 350
Even clients who may be willing to trust their attorneys in a more
adversarial position351 may be hesitant to be as candid, knowing
that any interaction could end up in a government database,
subject to exposure by a hacker or whistleblower.
V. CONCLUSION
It is more appropriate to expand the efforts of the ABA to
educate attorneys on the risks of facilitating money laundering
than to impose on law firms costly and unclear regulatory
requirements that have not been effective in their use on financial
institutions. Imposing these requirements would not address any
of the significant problems with the current US AML regulatory
scheme and would instead burden small law firms in the United
States that would be unable to cope with the significant costs of
such a regulatory expansion. Further, the fundamental changes to
the attorney-client relationship would injure the nature of the
relationship with little benefit. Therefore, the United States should
instead invest in educational efforts to allow attorneys to address
the risks of money laundering in a more cost-effective approach.

348. See Kirby, supra note 263, at 310.
349. See Osborne, supra note 265, at 29.
350. See Cybersecurity Res. Ctr., CyberSecurity Incidents, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ [perma.cc/UP3F-KFL4]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (detailing the 2015 leak of “personnel data of 4.2 million
current and former Federal government employees.”); see also Deb Riechmann, Costs of
Snowden leak still mounting 5 years later, AP NEWS (Jun. 4, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/797f390ee28b4bfbb0e1b13cfedf0593
[perma.cc/M6MC78CU] (discussing the breach of the National Security Agency by Edward Snowden).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 263-64.
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